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Abstract
Perceptual organization is the process of grouping scene elements into whole entities. A
classic example is contour integration, in which separate line segments are perceived as
continuous contours. Uncertainty in such grouping arises from scene ambiguity and sensory
noise. Some classic Gestalt principles of contour integration, and more broadly, of percep-
tual organization, have been re-framed in terms of Bayesian inference, whereby the
observer computes the probability that the whole entity is present. Previous studies that pro-
posed a Bayesian interpretation of perceptual organization, however, have ignored sensory
uncertainty, despite the fact that accounting for the current level of perceptual uncertainty is
one of the main signatures of Bayesian decision making. Crucially, trial-by-trial manipulation
of sensory uncertainty is a key test to whether humans perform near-optimal Bayesian infer-
ence in contour integration, as opposed to using some manifestly non-Bayesian heuristic.
We distinguish between these hypotheses in a simplified form of contour integration, namely
judging whether two line segments separated by an occluder are collinear. We manipulate
sensory uncertainty by varying retinal eccentricity. A Bayes-optimal observer would take the
level of sensory uncertainty into account—in a very specific way—in deciding whether a
measured offset between the line segments is due to non-collinearity or to sensory noise.
We find that people deviate slightly but systematically from Bayesian optimality, while still
performing “probabilistic computation” in the sense that they take into account sensory
uncertainty via a heuristic rule. Our work contributes to an understanding of the role of sen-
sory uncertainty in higher-order perception.
Author summary
Our percept of the world is governed not only by the sensory information we have access
to, but also by the way we interpret this information. When presented with a visual scene,
our visual system undergoes a process of grouping visual elements together to form coher-
ent entities so that we can interpret the scene more readily and meaningfully. For example,
when looking at a pile of autumn leaves, one can still perceive and identify a whole leaf
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even when it is partially covered by another leaf. While Gestalt psychologists have long
described perceptual organization with a set of qualitative laws, recent studies offered a
statistically-optimal—Bayesian, in statistical jargon—interpretation of this process,
whereby the observer chooses the scene configuration with the highest probability given
the available sensory inputs. However, these studies drew their conclusions without con-
sidering a key actor in this kind of statistically-optimal computations, that is the role of
sensory uncertainty. One can easily imagine that our decision on whether two contours
belong to the same leaf or different leaves is likely going to change when we move from
viewing the pile of leaves at a great distance (high sensory uncertainty), to viewing very
closely (low sensory uncertainty). Our study examines whether and how people incorpo-
rate uncertainty into contour integration, an elementary form of perceptual organization,
by varying sensory uncertainty from trial to trial in a simple contour integration task. We
found that people indeed take into account sensory uncertainty, however in a way that
subtly deviates from optimal behavior.
Introduction
Perceptual organization is the process whereby the brain integrates primitive elements of a
visual scene into whole entities. Typically, the same scene could afford different interpretations
because of ambiguity and perceptual noise. How the brain singles out one interpretation has
long been described to follow a set of qualitative principles defined in Gestalt psychology. For
example, contour integration, a form of perceptual organization that consists of the perceptual
grouping of distinct line elements into a single continuous contour, is often described by the
Gestalt principles of “good continuation” and “proximity”. These principles state that humans
extrapolate reasonable object boundaries by grouping local contours consistent with a smooth
global structure [1].
While Gestalt principles represent a useful catalogue of well-established perceptual phe-
nomena, they lack a theoretical basis, cannot make quantitative predictions, and are agnostic
with respect to uncertainty arising from sensory noise. This not only limits understanding at
the psychological level, it is also problematic within a broader agenda of quantitatively linking
neural activity in different brain areas to behavior. For example, neural investigations of the
perception of illusory contours, a phenomenon in contour integration in which the observer
perceives object contours when they are not physically present, have largely remained at a
qualitative level. An alternative approach that does not suffer from these shortcomings uses the
framework of Bayesian inference, whereby the observer computes the probabilities of possible
world states given sensory observations using Bayes’ rule [2]. In the realm of perceptual orga-
nization, Bayesian models stipulate that the observer computes the probabilities of different
hypotheses about which elements belong to the same object (e.g., [3–6]). For the example of
contour integration, such hypotheses would be that line elements belong to the same contour
and that they belong to different contours.
A fully Bayesian approach to contour integration would provide a normative way for deal-
ing both with high-level uncertainty arising from ambiguity in the latent structure of the
scene, and with low-level (sensory) uncertainty arising from noise in measuring primitive ele-
ments of the scene. Crucially, however, previous studies in perceptual organization, and more
specifically contour integration, have looked at the statistics of the environment [5] but have
not examined whether the decision rule adapts flexibly as a function of sensory uncertainty.
Such adaptation is a form of probabilistic computation and, while not unique, is one of the
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basic signatures of Bayesian inference in perception [7]. This question is fundamental to
understanding whether, how, and to which extent the brain represents and computes with
probability distributions [8]. A trial-by-trial manipulation of sensory uncertainty is an effective
test of probabilistic computation, because otherwise Bayesian inference would be indistin-
guishable from an observer using an inflexible, uncertainty-independent mapping [9, 10].
While the variation of sensory reliability is not the only possible form of uncertainty manipula-
tion, it has been a successful approach for studying probabilistic computation in low-level per-
ception, such as in multisensory cue combination [11, 12] and in integration of sensory
measurements with prior expectations [13, 14]. Moreover, tasks with varying sensory uncer-
tainty have yielded insights into the neural representation of uncertainty [15, 16].
In the current study, we investigate the effect of varying sensory uncertainty on an atomic
form of contour integration. Specifically, we manipulate sensory uncertainty unpredictably on
a trial-to-trial basis by changing stimulus retinal eccentricity in a simple collinearity judgment
task. Our experimental manipulation allows for a stronger test of the hypothesis that percep-
tual grouping is a form of Bayesian inference, at least for the elementary case of collinearity
judgment of two line segments. However, looking for a qualitative empirical signature of
Bayesian computations, such as an effect of sensory uncertainty, is not enough because many
distinct decision strategies might produce similar behaviors [17, 18]. Proper quantitative com-
parison of Bayesian observer models against plausible alternatives is critical in establishing the
theoretical standing of the Bayesian approach [19–21]. For example, as an alternative to per-
forming the complex, hierarchical computations characteristic of optimal Bayesian inference,
the brain might draw instead on simpler non-Bayesian decision rules and non-probabilistic
heuristics [22, 23] such as grouping scene elements based on some simple, learned rule. In con-
tour integration, such a simple rule may dictate that line elements belong to the same contour
if they are close enough in space and orientation, independently of other properties of the
scene. Therefore, here we rigorously compare the Bayesian strategy, and sub-optimal variants
thereof, against alternative and markedly non-Bayesian decision rules, both probabilistic and
non-probabilistic. While we find compelling evidence of probabilistic computation, a probabi-
listic, non-Bayesian heuristic model outperforms the Bayes-optimal model, suggesting a form
of sub-optimality in the decision-making process. Our study paves the way for a combined
understanding of how different sources of uncertainty affect contour integration, and offers
the opportunity for rigorous Bayesian modeling to be extended to more complex forms of per-
ceptual organization.
Results
Subjects (n = 8) performed a collinearity judgment task (Fig 1A). On each trial, the participant
was presented with a vertical occluder and the stimulus consisted of two horizontal lines of
equal length on each side of the occluder. At stimulus offset, the participant reported whether
the two lines were collinear or not via a single key press. To avoid the learning of a fixed map-
ping, we withheld correctness feedback. In different blocks in the same sessions, participants
also completed a height judgment task (Fig 1B), with the purpose of providing us with an inde-
pendent estimate of the participants’ sensory noise. In both tasks, sensory uncertainty was
manipulated by varying retinal eccentricity on a trial to trial basis (Fig 1D). We investigated
whether people took into account their sensory noise σx(y), which varied with eccentricity
level y, when deciding about collinearity.
We found a main effect of vertical offset on the proportion of collinearity reports (two-way
repeated-measures ANOVA with Greenhouse-Geisser correction; F(3.69,114) = 101, � = 0.461,
p< 0.001, Z2p ¼ 0:766) and a main effect of eccentricity (F(2.38,169) = 51.2, � = 0.794, p< 0.001,
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Fig 1. Tasks and generative model. A: Collinearity judgment task. After stimulus offset, participants reported if the line segments belonged to the same line or
different lines. B: Height judgment task. Participants reported whether the left line segment was higher or the right line segment was higher. C: Generative model of
the collinearity judgment task. Trial type C = 1 when the two lines segments are collinear, and C = 0 when line segments are non-collinear. On a given trial, the
stimulus pair yL, yR randomly appeared around one of four eccentricity levels (y = 0, 4.8, 9.6, 16.8), measured by degrees of visual angle (dva). For all models, the
observer’s measurements xL, xR are assumed to follow a Gaussian distribution centered on the true stimulus yL, yR, respectively, with standard deviation σx(y)
dependent on eccentricity level y. D: Possible eccentricity levels (in dva). E: Stimulus distribution for collinearity judgment task. When C = 1, the vertical position
of the left line segment yL is drawn from a Gaussian distribution centered at y with fixed standard deviation σy; the vertical position of the right segment yR is then
set equal to yL. When C = 0, yL and yR are independently drawn from the same Gaussian.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006308.g001
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Z2p ¼ 0:419), suggesting that the experimental manipulations were effective (Fig 2A and 2B).
We also found a significant interaction between offset and eccentricity (F(4.38,30.7) = 7.88, � =
0.183, p< 0.001, Z2p ¼ 0:529), which is evident in the psychometric curves across subjects
(Fig 2C).
We did not find significant effects of learning across sessions (see S1 Appendix), so in our
analyses for each subject we pooled data from all sessions.
Models
We describe here three main observer models which correspond to different assumptions
with respect to when the observer reports “collinear”, that is three different forms of decision
boundaries (Fig 3).
Fig 3. Decision boundaries for fixed-criterion (Fixed), bayesian (Bayes) and linear heuristic (Lin) models (left to right). The probability of reporting “collinear”
given stimulus and eccentricity condition is equal to the probability that the observer’s measurements of vertical positions of left and right line segments fall within the
boundary defined by the model.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006308.g003
Fig 2. Collinearity judgement task data. A: Accuracy as a function of retinal eccentricity level (chance probability = 0.5). B: Proportion of reporting “collinear” as
a function of vertical offset between the two line segments. C: Proportion of reporting “collinear” as a function of vertical offset of the two line segments at each
eccentricity level. Error bars indicate Mean ± 1 SEM across 8 subjects.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006308.g002
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We first consider the behavior of a Bayesian observer (“Bayes”) who utilizes the probability
distributions defined in the generative model of the task (Fig 1C) to make decisions that maxi-
mize the probability of being correct, given the available sensory measurements. In particular,
the Bayesian observer accounts for uncertainty when deciding whether a measured offset
between the line segments is due to non-collinearity or to sensory noise by choosing the cate-
gory (C = 1 or C = 0) with the highest posterior probability p(C|xL, xR), where xL, xR are mea-
surements of the two line segments on a particular trial. This strategy translates into reporting
“collinear” when xL, xR fall within the Bayesian decision boundary, which is a function of (a)
both measurements—not simply their difference—, (b) sensory noise (that is, eccentricity) in
the trial, (c) the belief about the offset distribution width σy, and (d) the prior belief about the
proportion of collinear trials p(C = 1) (Fig 3B). Note that a strictly Bayes-optimal observer
would have a prior that matches the experimental distribution, p(C = 1) = 0.5. Here we relaxed
the assumption and allowed p(C = 1) to be a free parameter. The basic Bayesian model assumes
that the observer knows the width of the offset distribution (fixed throughout the experiment)
and the noise level associated with the current trial; see Model variants for a relaxation of these
assumptions.
To investigate whether people apply instead a learned stimulus mapping that is uncertainty
independent, we tested a fixed-criterion model (“Fixed”) [24] in which the observer responds
that two line segments are collinear whenever the measured offset |xL − xR| is less than a fixed
distance κ (a free parameter of the model). This corresponds to an eccentricity-invariant deci-
sion boundary (Fig 3A).
Finally, we also considered an instance of probabilistic, non-Bayesian computation via a
heuristic model (“Lin”) in which the observer takes stimulus uncertainty into account in a
simple, linear way: the observer responds “collinear” whenever the measured offset |xL − xR| is
less than an uncertainty-dependent criterion,
kðyÞ ¼ k0 þ k1sxðyÞ ð1Þ
where κ0 and κ1 are free parameters of the model (Fig 3C). While the Lin model takes uncer-
tainty into account, and thus it is “probabilistic”, it is formally non-Bayesian because it does
not use knowledge of the statistics of the task to compute a posterior over latent variables [7]
(see also Discussion).
A detailed mathematical description of each model is reported in S1 Appendix.
Model comparison
To fully account for parameter uncertainty, we used Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) to
sample the posterior distributions of the parameters for each model and individual subject. To
estimate goodness of fit (that is, predictive accuracy) while taking into account model com-
plexity, we compared models using the leave-one-out cross-validation score (LOO), estimated
on a subject-by-subject basis directly from the MCMC posterior samples via Pareto smoothed
importance sampling [25] (see Methods). Higher LOO scores correspond to better predictive
accuracy and, thus, better models.
We found that the fixed-criterion model fits the worst (LOOBayes − LOOFixed = 25.6 ± 13.6,
LOOLin − LOOFixed = 69.3 ± 16.5; Mean ± SEM across subjects), while also yielding the poorest
qualitative fits to the behavioral data (Fig 4A). This result suggests that participants used not
only their measurements but also sensory uncertainty from trial to trial, thus providing first
evidence for probabilistic computation in collinearity judgment. Moreover, we find that the
linear heuristic model performs better than the Bayesian model (LOOLin − LOOBayes =
43.7 ± 13.3), suggestive of a suboptimal way of taking uncertainty into account.
PLOS COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY Sensory uncertainty in contour integration
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To allow for model heterogeneity across subjects, we also combined model evidence from
different subjects using a hierarchical Bayesian approach that treats the model as a random
variable to accommodate between-subject random effects [26]. This method allowed us to
compute the expected posterior frequency for each model, that is the probability that a ran-
domly chosen subject belongs to a particular model in the comparison. This analysis con-
firmed our previous model comparison ordering, with the Fixed model having the lowest
expected frequency (0.11 ± 0.09), Bayes the second highest (0.18 ± 0.11) and Lin by far the
highest (0.71 ± 0.13). We also calculated the protected exceedance probability [27], that is the
probability that a particular model is the most frequent model in the set, above and beyond
chance. We found consistent results—namely the Fixed model has the lowest protected
exceedance probability (0.048), followed by Bayes (0.062), and Lin (0.89).
Validation of noise parameters
In all analyses so far, the observer’s sensory noise levels at each eccentricity level σx(y) were
individually fitted as free parameters (four noise parameters, one per eccentricity level). To
obtain an independent estimate of the subjects’ noise, and thus verify if the noise parameters
estimated from the collinearity task data truly capture subjects’ sensory noise, we introduced
in the same sessions an independent Vernier discrimination task (height judgment task) [28,
29]. In this task, participants judged whether the right line segment was displaced above or
Fig 4. Model fits and model comparison for fixed-criterion (Fixed), bayesian (Bayes) and linear heuristic (Lin) models (from left to right). A: Model fits to
proportion of responding collinear as a function of vertical offset of the two line segments. Error bars indicate Mean ± 1 SEM across subjects. Shaded regions
indicates Mean ± 1 SEM of fits for each model, with each model on a separate column. B: Model comparison via leave-one-out cross-validation score (LOO). Bars
indicate individual subjects’ LOO scores for every model, relative to the fixed-criterion model. A positive value indicates that the model in the corresponding
column had a better LOO score than the fixed-criterion model. Shaded regions indicate Mean ± 1 SEM in LOO differences across subjects. The Lin model won the
model comparison, whereas Fixed was the worst model.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006308.g004
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below the left line segment (Figs 1B and 5A). Importantly, the observer’s optimal decision rule
in this task is based solely on the sign of the observer’s measured offset between the line seg-
ments, and does not depend on the magnitude of sensory noise (that is, respond “right seg-
ment higher” whenever xR> xL). Moreover, trials in this task matched the stimulus statistics
Fig 5. Height judgment task results. A: Height judgment task data. Proportion of reporting “right line segment higher” is plotted as a function of vertical offset
between line segments. Error bars indicate Mean ± 1 SEM across subjects. B: Noise parameters estimated from the best-fitting model, linear heuristic (Lin), on
collinearity judgment task vs. noise parameters estimated from the height judgment task, in dva. Each dot corresponds to a subject’s estimated noise parameters
(posterior means) for a given eccentricity level. C: Models’ fits to collinearity judgment task data when noise parameters estimated from the height judgment task
were imported into the models. Shaded regions indicate Mean ± 1 SEM of fits. See Fig 4A for comparison. D: Model comparison on collinearity judgment task data
via LOO, constrained by importing noise parameters from the height judgment task. Results are consistent with the model comparison ordering we found in the
original unconstrained fits, with free noise parameters (see Fig 4B for comparison).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006308.g005
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used in non-collinear trials of the collinearity judgment task. Therefore, the height judgment
task afforded an independent set of estimates of subjects’ noise levels.
Repeated-measures ANOVA indicated a main effect of the vertical offset between the two
line segments on the proportion of reports “right higher” (F(2.58,80.1) = 320, � = 0.323,
p< 0.001, Z2p ¼ 0:912), no main effect of eccentricity (F(1.99,141) = 0.300, � = 0.662, p = 0.740,
Z2p ¼ 0:004), and an interaction between eccentricity and offset (F(4.67,32.7) = 8.75, � = 0.195,
p< 0.001, Z2p ¼ 0:556). These findings confirm that, as expected, participants in the height
judgement task took into account the offset, and their performance was also affected simulta-
neously by offset and eccentricity (that is, sensory noise).
We found that sensory noise parameters estimated from the best model (Lin) in the collin-
earity task were well correlated—across subjects and eccentricities—with those estimated from
the height judgment task (r = 0.88) (Fig 5B), indicating that the model is correctly capturing
subjects’ noise characteristics in collinearity judgment.
We next examined whether the model comparison between Bayes, Fixed, and Lin could be
constrained using the parameter estimates obtained from the height judgment task, and
whether such a constrained comparison would alter our findings. For each subject and each
eccentricity level, we imported the posterior mean of each noise parameter of that subject at
that eccentricity level, as estimated from the height judgment task, into the model for the col-
linearity task. This left the Bayes, Fixed, and Lin models with only 2, 2, and 3 free parameters,
respectively, which we estimated via MCMC as previously described. The fits of the con-
strained models were comparable to those of their unconstrained counterparts (compare
Fig 5C to Fig 4A). The quantitative comparison of the constrained models was also consistent
with that of the unconstrained models (compare Fig 5D to Fig 4B): LOOBayes − LOOFixed =
94.7 ± 25.1, LOOLin − LOOFixed = 150.6 ± 30.2. Overall, this analysis shows that our models
correctly captured subjects’ noise features, and that our conclusions are not merely due to
excessive flexibility of our models, as we obtain the same results with models with very few free
parameters.
As a further sanity check, we repeated the analysis in this section using maximum-a-poste-
riori (MAP) estimates for the noise parameters imported from the height judgment task
(instead of the posterior means), finding quantitatively similar results (correlation between
collinearity task and height judgement task parameters: r = 0.87; LOOBayes − LOOFixed =
93.5 ± 26.7; LOOLin − LOOFixed = 142.4 ± 28.3).
Suboptimality analysis
In the previous sections we have found that the Lin model wins the model comparison against
the Bayesian model, suggestive of suboptimal behavior among participants. Here we closely
examine the degree of suboptimality in terms of the loss of accuracy in the collinearity task
with respect to Bayes-optimal behavior.
In order to assess the accuracy that an observer with a given set of noise parameters could
achieve, had they performed Bayes-optimally, we proceeded as follows. For each subject, we
generated a simulated dataset from the Bayesian model using the maximum-a-posteriori noise
parameters σx(y) estimated from both the collinearity judgment task and the height judgment
task. We used both estimates to ensure that our results did not depend on a specific way of esti-
mating noise parameters. For this analysis, we assumed optimal parameters, that is pcommon =
0.5 and no lapse (λ = 0).
We found a significant difference between observed accuracy and estimated optimal accu-
racy based on collinearity judgment noise, as shown in Fig 6 (two-way repeated-measures
ANOVA with Greenhouse-Geisser correction; F(1.00,7.00) = 37.8, � = 1.00, p< 0.001,
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Z2p ¼ 0:844). There is a significant main effect of eccentricity (F(2.03,14.2) = 128, � = 0.675,
p< 0.001, Z2p ¼ 0:948), which is expected from the experimental manipulations. We also
found no significant interaction between optimality condition and eccentricity (F(2.22,15.5) =
2.31, � = 0.738, p = 0.106, Z2p ¼ 0:248). Analogously, for height judgement noise parameters,
there is also a significant difference between observed accuracy and estimated optimal accu-
racy (F(1.00,7.00) = 7.45, � = 1.00, p = 0.029, Z2p ¼ 0:516), a significant main effect of eccentricity
(F(1.85,13.0) = 54.4, � = 0.618, p< 0.001, Z2p ¼ 0:886), and no significant interaction between
optimality condition and eccentricity (F(2.16,15.1) = 3.46, � = 0.720, p = 0.055, Z2p ¼ 0:331).
These results confirm the results of the model comparison in that there is a statistically signifi-
cant difference between our subjects’ performance and optimal behavior.
However, a statistically significant difference does not necessarily imply a substantial differ-
ence in terms of performance, as previous studies have shown that participants can be “opti-
mally lazy” by deviating from optimal performance in a way that has minimal impact on
overall expected score in a task [30]. We quantified our subjects’ performance in terms of effi-
ciency, that is the proportion of correct responses with respect to optimal behavior. Our sub-
jects exhibited an overall efficiency of 0.953 ± 0.007 (based on collinearity judgment noise), or
0.959 ± 0.015 (based on height judgement noise), which suggests that our subjects were only
slightly suboptimal (see Discussion).
Model variants
We consider here several alternative observer models that relax some key assumptions we
made when constructing our main observers, to verify whether our findings still hold.
Trial dependency of sensory uncertainty. We tested for potential influence of stimulus
uncertainty from previous trials (“History” model) on the response of the current trial. Specifi-
cally, for the History model we extended the formula of the decision boundary of the Lin
model to be a linear function of the noise parameters of the current trial, as before, plus the
noise associated with up to four previous trials, that is σx(yt), σx(yt−1), σx(yt−2), σx(yt−3), σx(yt−4),
respectively, each one with a separate weight.
Fig 6. Suboptimality analysis. Black line: Observed accuracy across four eccentricity levels (chance probability = 0.5).
Error bars indicate Mean ± 1 SEM across subjects. Green line: Estimated accuracy if subjects perform Bayes-optimally,
with noise parameters obtained via the collinearity judgement task. Blue line: Estimated accuracy with noise
parameters obtained via the height judgment task. Performance was slightly suboptimal across participants.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006308.g006
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We found no evidence of trial dependency based on sensory uncertainty, for the History
model fits about as well or even slightly worse than Lin (LOOHistory − LOOLin = −2.4 ± 0.24).
In particular, we also found that the maximum-a-posteriori weights associated with σx(yt−1) to
σx(yt−4) were all not significantly different from zero across participants (respectively, t(7) =
1.45, p = 0.19; t(7) = 0.0754, p = 0.94; t(7) = −1.18, p = 0.28; t(7) = −1.27, p = 0.24). These results
show that sensory uncertainty from previous trials had no effect on the observers’ decision in
the current trial.
Mismatch of noise parameters. So far, we have assumed that observers utilize directly
their noise parameters σx(y) when computing the decision rule. Here we propose a variant of
the Bayesian model, “Mismatch”, in which the observer instead uses a set of assumed noise
parameters that may deviate from the true standard deviations of their measurement distribu-
tions [31]. This model is identical to the Bayesian model except that all four σx(y) are substi-
tuted with σx,assumed(y), the assumed noise parameters, in the calculation of the decision
variables. To limit model complexity, we chose for the assumed noise parameters a parametric
form which is a linear function of the true noise parameters σx(y). To avoid issues of lack of
parameter identifiability [17], for the Mismatch model we also fixed pcommon = 0.5. Thus, the
Mismatch model has the same number of free parameters as Lin, and one more than Bayes.
After relaxing the Bayesian model to allow for assumed noise parameters, we found that the
Mismatch model fits better than the original Bayes model
(LOOMismatched sx   LOOBayes ¼ 29:8� 13:0), and, thus, better than the Fixed model as well,
which was already the worst in the comparison (LOOMismatched sx   LOOFixed ¼ 55:5� 14:0).
However, we found that the Lin model is still the best-fitting model
(LOOMismatched sx   LOOLin ¼   13:9� 5:4). All combined, these results suggest that a degree
of suboptimality in the observers might have arisen from a lack of knowledge of their own
noise characteristics [31], but such mismatch is not enough to entirely explain the observed
pattern of behavior.
Mismatch of stimulus distribution width. We consider another relaxation of the Bayes-
ian observer model, whereby the subject computes with an incorrect stimulus distribution
width σy,assumed, which governs the offset distribution (Fig 1E) and is fixed throughout the
experiment. In the main Bayesian model, the observer is assumed to have learned the true
value of σy from training trials presented during the experiment. However, it is possible that a
lack of attention during training or a lack of training itself could lead to a mismatched estima-
tion of σy, which then influences the calculation of the decision boundaries.
The results of this Width-mismatched model indicate that incorporating the incorrect
assumption of stimulus distribution width also effectively improves the performance of the
Bayesian model (LOOWidth  mismatchedsy   LOOBayes ¼ 14:8� 4:8) while still losing to the Lin
model (LOOWidth  mismatched sy   LOOLin ¼   28:9� 16:3). We see that the deviation from
optimality observed in the data might also be partially attributed to the lack of familiarity with
the stimulus distribution, yet still not enough to better account for the data than our current
best model, namely the Lin model.
Bayesian observer with decision noise. In the basic Bayesian model, we model the infer-
ence stage as exact. That is, we assume there is no noise or imperfection in the mapping from
the observer’s internal representation to the decision. We now consider a formulation of the
Bayesian model in which the observer performs Bayesian inference with decision noise [32].
Specifically, we model decision noise σd as a Gaussian noise on the decision variable [33–36]:
pðdjd�Þ ¼ N ðd; d�; s2dÞ; ð2Þ
where d� is the original decision variable in the basic Bayesian model (see S1 Appendix).
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Consistent with previous analyses, we see that this new relaxation of the original Bayesian
model with decision noise (Bayes+DN) better accounts for the behavioral data than the basic
Bayesian observer (LOOBayes+DN − LOOBayes = 25.4 ± 15.2), but is still not able to outperform
the Lin model (LOOBayes+DN − LOOLin = −18.3 ± 8.2).
Despite having tried different forms of relaxation of the basic Bayesian model, we still find
the Lin model to be our best performing model. Finally, taking our approach one step further,
we also tested a suboptimal Bayesian model in which we allowed for both stimulus distribution
width mismatch and decision noise. Having 8 free parameters, one more than the Lin model,
the hybrid model can be expected to be a very flexible model. However, while once again
improving on performance within the Bayesian formulation
(LOODNþWidth  mismatchedsy   LOOBayes ¼ 31:8� 6:4), the hybrid model is still could not surpass
the Lin model (LOODNþWidth  mismatchedsy   LOOLin ¼   11:9� 7:8).
Nonparametric examination. In the Lin model (and variants thereof), so far we assumed
a linear parametric relationship between the decision boundary and the noise level σx(y), as
per Eq 1.
Here we loosened this constraint and fitted the decision boundary for each eccentricity
level as an individual free parameter. Due to its flexible nature, we consider this “Nonparamet-
ric” model merely as a descriptive model, which we expect to describe the data very well. We
use the Nonparametric model as a means to provide an upper-bound on the LOO score for
each individual, so as to have an absolute metric to evaluate the performances of other models
(in a spirit similarly to estimating the entropy of the data, that is an estimate of the intrinsic
variability of the data which represents an upper bound on the predictive performance of any
model [37, 38]). As expected, given the large amount of flexibility, the Nonparametric model
fits better than Lin (LOONonparametric − LOOLin = 14.6 ± 6.5), but we note that the difference in
LOO is substantially less than the difference between Lin and Bayes (43.7 ± 13.3), or Lin and
Fixed (69.3 ± 16.5), suggesting that Lin is already capturing subjects’ behavior quite well, close
to a full nonparametric description of the data.
We can also use the Nonparametric model to examine how close the parametric estimates
of decision boundary from Lin, our best model so far, are to those obtained nonparametrically.
We observed that the average decision boundary across 8 subjects, as a function of eccentricity,
was consistent with the average nonparametric estimates of the decision boundary at every
eccentricity level (Fig 7A and 7B). This agreement means that the decision boundaries adopted
by observers in the task were, indeed, approximately linear in the sensory noise associated
with each eccentrity level, as assumed by the linear heuristic model (Eq 1), thus validating our
modeling choice.
Discussion
To study how people group together local elements to form a continuous contour, we designed
a behavioral experiment in which participants were asked to judge whether two line segments
partially occluded belonged to the same line. Using computational observer models to describe
the obtained data, we found that people utilize sensory uncertainty when making collinearity
judgements, however in a slightly suboptimal way. Crucially, our results are robust to changes
in model assumptions, such as noise model mismatch, history effects, and different decision
boundaries, and we independently validated our parameter estimates in a different task. With
trial-by-trial manipulation of eccentricity in a collinearity judgment task, our study presents a
rigorous examination of the role of sensory uncertainty for probabilistic computations in con-
tour integration.
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Contour integration as elementary perceptual organization
The present study is linked to the broader effort to study hierarchical Bayesian inference in
perception, whereby the observer is required to marginalize over stimulus values (here, line
offset) to build a posterior over latent, discrete causal scenarios (here, same line of different
lines). Such framework was adopted and tested in a variety of domains such as cue combina-
tion [39], change detection [33], perception of sameness [40], and causal inference [41].
In particular, our models share the same formal structure of models of causal inference in mul-
tisensory perception [41, 42]. In such tasks, the observer receives sensory measurements of
possibly discrepant cues from distinct sensory modalities (e.g., vision and hearing), and has to
infer whether the cues originated from the same source (C = 1) or from different sources
(C = 0)—leading to, respectively, cue integration and cue segregation. Previous work has
shown that Bayesian causal inference models provide a good qualitative description of human
performance in multisensory perception with discrepant cues, but quantitative comparison
hints at deviations from exact Bayesian behavior [38], not unlike what we find here. Our study
differs from previous work in that here we focus on an atomic form of perceptual organization.
Our approach is related to the work by Stevenson and Körding [43] in the field of depth
perception, which also provides an example of uncertainty manipulation used to probe the
basis of elementary perceptual organization. In their task, observers inferred whether a stereo-
graphically displayed disk was occluded or not, and utilized that information about the config-
uration of the visual scene to match the depth of another disk. Importantly, the experiment
included two different sensory uncertainty conditions. Biases in depth estimation showed by
subjects in the two conditions were well explained by a Bayesian model that inferred the rela-
tive probability of the two causal scenarios. Crucially, however, Stevenson and Körding did
not test alternative models that could also account for the data.
While in our study we closely examined the effect of varying sensory uncertainty, our task
did not strictly introduce ambiguity, a integral element of Gestalt perception. Ambiguity
Fig 7. Nonparametric model. A: Decision boundary estimates of linear heuristic model (Lin) vs. decision boundary estimates of the Nonparametric model at
different eccentricity levels (Mean ± 1 SEM). B: Decision boundary at every eccentricity level fitted non-parametrically vs. Decision boundary at every eccentricity
level fitted from the Lin model. Even when allowed to vary freely (“non-parametrically”), the decision boundaries are approximately linear in the sensory noise
associated with each eccentricity level (and, incidentally, approximately linear in the eccentricity level itself), as per the Lin model.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006308.g007
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translates to overlapping stimulus distributions, and ambiguous trials are only found in the
collinear category of our task. With the presence of ambiguity, an observer will not be able to
achieve perfect performance even when sensory noise is completely absent. Shapes defined by
illusory contours such as variants of the Kanizsa triangle were previously used to study repre-
sentations of illusory contours in the cortical areas of the brain in functional imaging [44, 45],
rendering them potential candidates for stimuli that can incorporate both ambiguity and sen-
sory uncertainty.
Nevertheless, by studying the role of sensory uncertainty alone, our study presents a more
careful account of Bayesian inference in contour integration, and potentially in perceptual
organization. In particular, we compared the Bayesian observer model against other observer
models that each describe an alternative plausible decision strategy. We were able to distin-
guish a fixed stimulus mapping that mimics Bayesian inference from probabilistic computa-
tion, which requires the observer to flexibly adjust their decision boundary according to
sensory uncertainty. Despite evidence for probabilistic computations, we found that data was
better explained by a non-Bayesian heuristic model (but see below for further discussion).
Using simple contour integration as a starting point, our study provides detailed examina-
tions of the Bayesian observer model in comparison to other models, paving the way for the
applications of similarly rigorous analyses on more complex and naturalistic forms of percep-
tual organization. Our paradigm can be modified to examine the effects of varying occluder
width, varying contour angles, thickness and curvature to simulate the complexity of real-
world contour statistics [5]; and to test whether humans utilize the task statistics when com-
puting the posterior probability of different explanations. Even in naturalistic perceptual orga-
nization tasks, Bayesian strategies are still favorable for their inherent ability to control for
model complexity, due to the process of marginalizing (i.e., integrating) over latent variables,
which tends to favor the simplest hypothesis (property often referred to as ‘Bayesian Occam’s
razor’ [46]). Notably, the model comparison pipeline laid out in the current study can be easily
extended to be applied to these tasks.
Heuristic and imperfect strategies in probabilistic contour integration
Our findings align with a variety of results that show that, in many perceptual decision making
tasks, humans perform moderately to reasonably well, but not quite in a Bayes-optimal man-
ner [47]. In particular, extended and rigorous model comparison often reveals that human
behavior can be better explained by observer models representing strategies or heuristics
which are not exactly Bayesian [31, 36, 38, 48–50] (but see [37] for an example where the
Bayes-optimal model wins against a wide array of contenders).
However, the difference between a probabilistic, non-Bayesian heuristic (which may be
interpreted as “approximating Bayesian inference”) and an imperfect, noisy or mismatched
Bayesian model is arguably moot. When people deviate from ‘correct’ Bayesian behavior, it
can be very hard—and it might even become impossible in principle—to fully distinguish
between (a) mismatched Bayesian computations (i.e., due to ‘model mismatch’ between the
observer’s beliefs and the true statistics of the task); (b) approximate Bayesian computations
(due to implementations of approximate inference in the brain, necessary to deal with any
complex models of the environment, and with limited resources [51]); (c) the adoption of
some other complex heuristics with certain Bayesian-looking signatures (e.g., taking uncer-
tainty into account). Even when the behavior looks fairly Bayesian, as for example according to
a probabilistic strategy that takes uncertainty into account in an approximately correct way,
we may be unable to distinguish “truly” Bayesian computations (that explicitly account for
uncertainty according to Bayes’ rule) from arbitrarily complex non-Bayesian strategies that
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use complex heuristics and properties of the stimulus to estimate the current trial uncertainty.
The problem is ill-posed in psychophysics as there is always some property of the stimulus
which correlates with trial uncertainty, and we cannot know the exact computations being per-
formed in the brain until we open the black box and look at the actual neural implementation.
The empirical question that we can address via psychophysics is how flexible the subjects’
strategies are in accounting for uncertainty, and how close they end up being to the Bayesian
strategy, independently of the source of uncertainty, and even when multiple sources of uncer-
tainty are combined [52]. Moreover, we can use psychophysical data to investigate why (and
how) subjects deviate from the optimal performance, and how the brain learns to process sen-
sory information so as to perform a given task, which is an avenue for future work.
In our case, a possible explanation for subjects’ heuristic strategy, which differed slightly but
systematically from optimal performance, might be that they had received insufficient training.
While we found no evidence of learning across sessions, it is possible that participants would
have learnt to perform optimally had they received correctness feedback on the task, possibly
with greater incentives to motivate their learning. The main purpose of our experiment was to
explore the role of sensory uncertainty—thus, we limited the amount of training trials with per-
formance feedback on purpose, to prevent the possible learning of a fixed mapping of stimulus
to collinearity condition that is independent of sensory uncertainty. The tradeoff between pro-
viding sufficient training trials and avoiding learning of fixed mapping makes it difficult to test
behaviorally the hypothesis that sub-optimality stems from insufficient training.
A possible alternative avenue for exploring the effect of task learning could be through
training an artificial neural network on the same psychophysical task, and examining how per-
formance evolves as a function of training epochs [53], and whether this mimics human
behavior. For example, a hierarchical, probabilistic and stochastic neural network such as
Deep Boltzmann Machine is a desirable candidate as it can learn to generate sensory data in an
unsupervised fashion, a procedure that provides a plausible account for visual cortical process-
ing [54, 55]. Notably, such stochastic hierarchical generative model was used to show that
visual numerosity—a higher-order feature—can be invariantly encoded in the deepest hidden
layer of the neural network [56], and could analogously give rise to illusory contours neurons
as found in monkeys [54].
In conclusion, our finding that elementary contour integration is probabilistic—albeit
slightly suboptimal—leads naturally to a fundamental open question in neuroscience, that is
whether and how the visual system performs (or approximates) probabilistic inference in the
presence of complex, naturalistic stimuli. There is a trade-off between stimulus complexity
and modeling tractability in that we experimenters do not normally have access to the genera-
tive model of a complex visual scene, preventing the deployment of powerful statistical tools
from ideal-observer analysis such as those used in the current work. However, for example, a
recent theoretical paper introduced a flexible, parametric model of overlapping and occluded
geometric shapes that resemble the pattern of a bed of leaves (“dead leaves” [57]). Our rigorous
model comparison approach, combined with such complex psychophysical stimuli, provides a
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Subjects
8 subjects (6 female), aged 20–30, participated in the experiment. Subjects received $10 for
each of four 1-hour sessions, plus a completion bonus of $10.
Apparatus and stimuli
The stimuli were shown on a 60 Hz 9.7-inch 2048-by-1536 pixel display. The display (LG
LP097QX1-SPA2) was the same as that used in the 2013 iPad Air (Apple). The screen was
secured to an arm with height adjusted to each subject’s eye level. A chin rest was horizontally
aligned with the center of the screen. The distance between the eyes and the display was 27.5
cm. To minimize potential biases caused by external visual cues, we added a large black panel
surrounding the display. The display was connected to a Windows desktop PC using the Psy-
chophysics Toolbox extensions [58, 59] for MATLAB (MathWorks, Natick, MA).
On each trial, a dark gray occluder (23 cd/m2) with a width of 5.6 degrees of visual angle
(dva) was displayed against a light gray background (50 cd/m2). A white (159 cd/m2) fixation
dot 0.24 dva in diameter was shown in the lower central part of the occluder; this dot corre-
sponded to a retinal eccentricity of 0 dva. The stimuli consisted of two horizontal white line
segments on both sides of the occluder. The line segments were all 5.6 dva in width and 0.16
dva in height. The vertical “base position” y of a pair of line segments had one of four levels of
retinal eccentricity (0, 4.8, 9.6, and 16.8 dva).
Trial procedure
Subjects completed two tasks, which we call collinearity judgment task and height judgment
task. On each trial in the collinearity judgment task (Fig 1A), the occluder and fixation dot
were displayed for 850 ms, followed by the stimulus for 100 ms. On a “non-collinear” trial,
the vertical positions of the two line segments were independently drawn from a normal dis-
tribution centered at one of the four “base” eccentricity levels (0, 4.8, 9.6, or 16.8 dva), with a
standard deviation of 0.48 dva (Fig 1E); on a “collinear” trial, we drew the vertical position of
the line segment on one side and matched the line segment on the other side. In each session,
50% of the trials were “collinear” and 50% were “non-collinear”, randomly interleaved. At
stimulus offset, the fixation dot turned green to prompt the subject to indicate whether the
two line segments were collinear. The participant pressed one of 8 keys, corresponding to 8
choice-confidence combinations, ranging from high-confident collinear to high-confident
non-collinear. Response time was not constrained. No performance feedback was given at
the end of the trial.
Height judgment task trials followed the same procedure (Fig 1B), except that the subject
was asked to report which of the two line segments was highest (“left” or “right”). We gener-
ated the line segments in the same fashion as in the “non-collinear” condition of the collinear-
ity judgment task. Audio feedback was given after each response to indicate whether the
choice was correct.
For the analyses described in this paper, we only considered choice data (“collinear/non-
collinear”, “left/right”), leaving analysis of confidence reports to future work.
Experiment procedure
During each session, subjects completed one height judgment task block, followed by three
collinearity judgment task blocks, and finished with another height judgment task block. Each
height judgment task block consisted of 60 trials, and each collinearity judgment task block
consisted of 200 trials.
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A demonstration of the experimental procedure was given to each subject at the beginning
of the first session. Participants were informed that there were an equal number of left/right
trials in the height judgment task as well as an equal number of collinear/non-collinear trials
in the collinearity judgment task. To familiarize subjects with the stimulus distribution and to
check for understanding of the tasks, participants completed 16 practice trials at the beginning
of each session. Stimulus presentation time was longer on practice trials (500 ms), and audio
correctness feedback was given at the end of each practice trial. We did not analyze the
responses on the practice trials.
Data analysis
In order to visualize psychometric curves with enough trials, we binned the offset values
between the left and right line segments into the following intervals: (−1, −3.31], (−3.31,
−2.08], (−2.08, −1.17], (−1.17, −0.38], (−0.38, 0.38], (0.38, 1.17], (1.17, 2.08], (2.08, 3.31], (3.31,
1), in dva. These values were chosen to include a comparable number of trials per interval,
based on the quantiles of the Gaussian distribution of the offset used in the experiment. For
the collinearity judgment task, we computed the proportion of trials in which subjects reported
“collinear” at each offset bin and retinal eccentricity level. For the height judgment task, we
computed the proportion of trials in which subjects reported “right higher” at each offset bin
and retinal eccentricity level.
Repeated-measures ANOVA with offset bin and eccentricity level as within-subjects factors
were performed separately on the proportion of reporting “collinear” in the collinearity judg-
ment task and the proportion of reporting “right higher” in the height judgment task. We
applied Greenhouse-Geisser correction of the degrees of freedom in order to account for devi-
ations from sphericity [60], and report effect sizes as partial eta squared, denoted with Z2p.
For all analyses the criterion for statistical significance was p< .05, and we report uncor-
rected p-values. Unless specified otherwise, summary statistics are reported in the text as
mean ± SEM between subjects. Note that we used the summary statistics described in this sec-
tion only for visualization and to perform simple descriptive statistics; all models were fitted to
raw trial data as described next.
Model fitting
For each model and subject, the noise parameters s2xðyÞ for y = 0, 4.8, 9.6 and 16.8 dva were fit-
ted as individual parameters.
We calculated the log likelihood of each individual dataset for a given model with parame-







logpθ;modelðĈijyLi ; yRi ; s
2
xðyiÞÞ ð3Þ
where the response probability pθ;modelðĈijyLi ; yRi ; s
2
xðyiÞÞ is defined in S1 Appendix.
We fitted the models by drawing samples from the unnormalized log posterior distribution
of the parameters p(θ|data) using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (parallel slice sampling [38, 61])
for each subject. The posterior distribution of the parameters is proportional to the sum of
data likelihood (Eq 4) and a factorized prior over each parameter j,
logpðθjdata;modelÞ ¼ logpðdatajθ;modelÞ þ
X
j
logpðθjjmodelÞ þ const: ð4Þ
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We used log-transformed coordinates for scale parameters (e.g., noise), and for all parame-
ters we assumed a uniform non-informative prior (uniform in log space for scale parameters)
[62], within reasonably large bounds. Three parallel chains were ran with starting point set at
maximum likelihood point estimates of the parameters, evaluated with Bayesian Adaptive
Direct Search [63], to ensure that the chains were initialized within a high posterior density
region.
After running all chains, we computed Gelman and Rubin’s potential scale reduction statis-
tic R for all parameters to check for convergence [64]. An R value that diverges from 1 indi-
cates convergence problems, whereas a value close to 1 suggests convergence of the chains.
The average difference between R value and 1 across all parameters, subjects and models is
1.16 × 10−4, and all R values fall within (0.99, 1.003], suggesting good convergence. To verify
compatibility between different runs, we also visually inspected the posteriors from different
chains. We merged samples from all chains for each model and subject in further analyses.
To visualize model fits (or posterior predictions) in Figs 4 and 5, we computed the posterior
mean model prediction for each subject based on 60 independent samples from the posterior
(equally spaced in the sampled chains). We then plotted average and standard deviation across
subjects.
Model comparison
To estimate the predictive accuracy of each model while taking into account model complex-
ity, we performed Bayesian leave-one-out (LOO) cross-validation. Bayesian LOO cross-
validation computes the posterior of the parameters given N − 1 trials (the training set), and
evaluates the (log) expected likelihood of the left-out trial (the test set); this process is repeated







where pðĈijθ;modelÞ is the likelihood of the i-th trial (see Eq 3), and p(θ|data−i, model) is the
posterior over θ given all trials except the i-th one. For most models, evaluating Eq 5 naively is
impractical due to the cost of obtaining the leave-one-out posteriors via N distinct MCMC
runs. However, noting that all posteriors differ from the full posterior by only one data point,
one could approximate the leave-one-out posteriors via importance sampling, reweighting the
full posterior obtained in a single MCMC run. Still, a direct approach of importance sampling
can be unstable, since the full posterior is typically narrower than the leave-one-out posteriors.
Pareto-smoothed importance sampling (PSIS) is a recent but already widely used technique to
















where θ(s) is the s-th parameter sample from the posterior, and wðsÞi are the Pareto-smoothed
importance weights associated to the i-th trial and s-th sample (out of S); see [25] for details
and [38] for an application with discussion of other model selection metrics.
We also conducted model comparison by computing a simpler metric, namely the Akaike
information criterion (AIC) using log likelihood values obtained via maximum likelihood esti-
mation for each subject and each model. We found a perfect rank correlation between AIC
scores and LOO scores (ρ = 1), which is expected in the limit of infinite trials, for AIC and
LOO cross-validation are asymptotically equivalent [65].
PLOS COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY Sensory uncertainty in contour integration
PLOS Computational Biology | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006308 November 30, 2020 18 / 22
Supporting information
S1 Appendix. Supplemental methods. Analysis of learning; model specification; model recov-
ery analysis; posterior distributions of model parameters.
(PDF)
Acknowledgments
We thank Andra Mihali, Will Adler, Maija Honig and Zahy Bnaya for useful discussions of
earlier versions of this manuscript. This work has utilized the NYU IT High Performance
Computing resources and services.
Author Contributions
Conceptualization: Yanli Zhou, Luigi Acerbi, Wei Ji Ma.
Data curation: Yanli Zhou.
Formal analysis: Yanli Zhou, Luigi Acerbi.
Funding acquisition: Wei Ji Ma.
Investigation: Yanli Zhou.
Methodology: Yanli Zhou, Luigi Acerbi, Wei Ji Ma.
Project administration: Yanli Zhou, Luigi Acerbi, Wei Ji Ma.
Resources: Wei Ji Ma.
Software: Yanli Zhou, Luigi Acerbi.
Supervision: Luigi Acerbi, Wei Ji Ma.
Validation: Yanli Zhou, Luigi Acerbi.
Visualization: Yanli Zhou.
Writing – original draft: Yanli Zhou, Luigi Acerbi.
Writing – review & editing: Yanli Zhou, Luigi Acerbi, Wei Ji Ma.
References
1. Wertheimer M. Gestalt theory. In Ellis W. D. (Ed.). In: A source book of Gestalt psychology. Kegan Paul
Trench, Trubner & Company; 1938. p. 1–11.
2. Knill DC, Richards W. Perception as Bayesian inference. Cambridge University Press; 1996.
3. Feldman J. Bayesian contour integration. Perception & Psychophysics. 2001; 63(7):1171–1182. https://
doi.org/10.3758/BF03194532 PMID: 11766942
4. Elder JH, Goldberg RM. Ecological statistics of Gestalt laws for the perceptual organization of contours.
Journal of Vision. 2002; 2(4):5. https://doi.org/10.1167/2.4.5 PMID: 12678582
5. Geisler WS, Perry JS. Contour statistics in natural images: grouping across occlusions. Visual Neuro-
science. 2009; 26(01):109. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0952523808080875 PMID: 19216819
6. Froyen V, Kogo N, Singh M, Feldman J. Modal and amodal shape completion. Journal of Vision. 2015;
15(12):321. https://doi.org/10.1167/15.12.321
7. Ma WJ. Organizing probabilistic models of perception. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 2012; 16
(10):511–518. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2012.08.010 PMID: 22981359
8. Pouget A, Beck JM, Ma WJ, Latham PE. Probabilistic brains: knowns and unknowns. Nature Neurosci-
ence. 2013; 16(9):1170–1178. https://doi.org/10.1038/nn.3495 PMID: 23955561
PLOS COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY Sensory uncertainty in contour integration
PLOS Computational Biology | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006308 November 30, 2020 19 / 22
9. Maloney LT, Mamassian P. Bayesian decision theory as a model of human visual perception: testing
Bayesian transfer. Visual Neuroscience. 2009; 26(01):147. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0952523808080905 PMID: 19193251
10. Ma WJ, Jazayeri M. Neural coding of uncertainty and probability. Annual Review of Neuroscience.
2014; 37(1):205–220. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-neuro-071013-014017 PMID: 25032495
11. Ernst MO, Banks MS. Humans integrate visual and haptic information in a statistically optimal fashion.
Nature. 2002; 415(6870):429–433. https://doi.org/10.1038/415429a PMID: 11807554
12. Alais D, Burr D. The ventriloquist effect results from near-optimal bimodal integration. Current Biology.
2004; 14(3):257–262. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2004.01.029 PMID: 14761661
13. Stocker AA, Simoncelli EP. Noise characteristics and prior expectations in human visual speed percep-
tion. Nature Neuroscience. 2006; 9(4):578–585. https://doi.org/10.1038/nn1669 PMID: 16547513
14. Girshick AR, Landy MS, Simoncelli EP. Cardinal rules: visual orientation perception reflects knowledge
of environmental statistics. Nature Neuroscience. 2011; 14(7):926–932. https://doi.org/10.1038/nn.
2831 PMID: 21642976
15. Fetsch CR, Pouget A, DeAngelis GC, Angelaki DE. Neural correlates of reliability-based cue weighting
during multisensory integration. Nature Neuroscience. 2011; 15(1):146–154. https://doi.org/10.1038/
nn.2983 PMID: 22101645
16. Rohe T, Noppeney U. Cortical hierarchies perform Bayesian causal inference in multisensory percep-
tion. PLoS Biology. 2015; 13(2):e1002073. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.1002073 PMID:
25710328
17. Acerbi L, Ma WJ, Vijayakumar S. A framework for testing identifiability of Bayesian models of percep-
tion. In: Advances in neural information processing systems; 2014. p. 1026–1034.
18. Adler WT, Ma WJ. Limitations of proposed signatures of Bayesian confidence. Neural Computation.
2018; 30(12):3327–3354. https://doi.org/10.1162/neco_a_01141 PMID: 30314423
19. Jones M, Love BC. Bayesian fundamentalism or enlightenment? On the explanatory status and theoret-
ical contributions of Bayesian models of cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 2011; 34(04):169–
188. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X10003134 PMID: 21864419
20. Bowers JS, Davis CJ. Bayesian just-so stories in psychology and neuroscience. Psychological Bulletin.
2012; 138(3):389. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0026450 PMID: 22545686
21. Palminteri S, Wyart V, Koechlin E. The importance of falsification in computational cognitive modeling.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 2017; 21(6):425–433. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2017.03.011 PMID:
28476348
22. Simon HA. Rational choice and the structure of the environment. Psychological Review. 1956; 63
(2):129–138. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0042769 PMID: 13310708
23. Gigerenzer G, Gaissmaier W. Heuristic decision making. Annual Review of Psychology. 2011; 62
(1):451–482. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145346 PMID: 21126183
24. Qamar AT, Cotton RJ, George RG, Beck JM, Prezhdo E, Laudano A, et al. Trial-to-trial, uncertainty-
based adjustment of decision boundaries in visual categorization. Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences. 2013; 110(50):20332–20337. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1219756110 PMID: 24272938
25. Vehtari A, Gelman A, Gabry J. Practical Bayesian model evaluation using leave-one-out cross-valida-
tion and WAIC. Statistics and Computing. 2017; 27(5):1413–1432. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11222-016-
9709-3
26. Stephan K, Penny W, Daunizeau J, Moran R, Friston K. Bayesian model selection for group studies.
NeuroImage. 2009; 47:S167. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.03.025 PMID: 19306932
27. Rigoux L, Stephan KE, Friston KJ, Daunizeau J. Bayesian model selection for group studies—Revisited.
NeuroImage. 2014; 84:971–985. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.08.065 PMID: 24018303
28. Westheimer G. Visual hyperacuity. In: Progress in Sensory Physiology. Springer Berlin Heidelberg;
1981. p. 1–30.
29. Harris JP, Fahle M. The detection and discrimination of spatial offsets. Vision Research. 1995; 35
(1):51–58. https://doi.org/10.1016/0042-6989(94)E0082-V PMID: 7839609
30. Acerbi L, Vijayakumar S, Wolpert DM. Target uncertainty mediates sensorimotor error correction. PLoS
ONE. 2017; 12(1):e0170466. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0170466 PMID: 28129323
31. Acerbi L, Vijayakumar S, Wolpert DM. On the origins of suboptimality in human probabilistic inference.
PLoS Computational Biology. 2014; 10(6):e1003661. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003661
PMID: 24945142
32. Mueller ST, Weidemann CT. Decision noise: An explanation for observed violations of signal detection
theory. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review. 2008; 15(3):465–494. https://doi.org/10.3758/PBR.15.3.465
PMID: 18567246
PLOS COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY Sensory uncertainty in contour integration
PLOS Computational Biology | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006308 November 30, 2020 20 / 22
33. Keshvari S, van den Berg R, Ma WJ. Probabilistic computation in human perception under variability in
encoding precision. PLoS ONE. 2012; 7(6):e40216. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0040216
PMID: 22768258
34. Keshvari S, van den Berg R, Ma WJ. No evidence for an item limit in change detection. PLoS Computa-
tional Biology. 2013; 9(2):e1002927. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002927 PMID: 23468613
35. Drugowitsch J, Wyart V, Devauchelle AD, Koechlin E. Computational precision of mental inference as
critical source of human choice suboptimality. Neuron. 2016; 92(6):1398–1411. https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.neuron.2016.11.005 PMID: 27916454
36. Stengård E, van den Berg R. Imperfect Bayesian inference in visual perception. PLoS Computational
Biology. 2019; 15(4):e1006465. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006465 PMID: 30998675
37. Shen S, Ma WJ. A detailed comparison of optimality and simplicity in perceptual decision making. Psy-
chological Review. 2016; 123(4):452. https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000028 PMID: 27177259
38. Acerbi L, Dokka K, Angelaki DE, Ma WJ. Bayesian comparison of explicit and implicit causal inference
strategies in multisensory heading perception. PLoS Computational Biology. 2018; 14(7):e1006110.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006110 PMID: 30052625
39. Landy MS, Banks MS, Knill DC. Sensory Cue Integration. Oxford University Press; 2011.
40. van den Berg R, Vogel M, Josic K, Ma WJ. Optimal inference of sameness. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences. 2012; 109(8):3178–3183. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1108790109 PMID:
22315400
41. Körding KP, Beierholm U, Ma WJ, Quartz S, Tenenbaum JB, Shams L. Causal inference in multisen-
sory perception. PLoS ONE. 2007; 2(9):e943. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0000943
42. Shams L, Beierholm UR. Causal inference in perception. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 2010; 14
(9):425–432. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2010.07.001 PMID: 20705502
43. Stevenson I, Koerding K. Structural inference affects depth perception in the context of potential occlu-
sion. In: Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems; 2009. p. 1777–1784.
44. Hirsch J, DeLaPaz RL, Relkin NR, Victor J, Kim K, Li T, et al. Illusory contours activate specific regions
in human visual cortex: evidence from functional magnetic resonance imaging. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences. 1995; 92(14):6469–6473. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.92.14.6469
PMID: 7604015
45. Mendola JD, Dale AM, Fischl B, Liu AK, Tootell RB. The representation of illusory and real contours in
human cortical visual areas revealed by functional magnetic resonance imaging. Journal of Neuroscience.
1999; 19(19):8560–8572. https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.19-19-08560.1999 PMID: 10493756
46. MacKay DJ, Mac Kay DJ. Information Theory, Inference and Learning Algorithms. Cambridge univer-
sity press; 2003.
47. Rahnev D, Denison RN. Suboptimality in perceptual decision making. Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
2018; 41. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X18000936 PMID: 29485020
48. Adler WT, Ma WJ. Comparing Bayesian and non-Bayesian accounts of human confidence reports.
PLoS Computational Biology. 2018; 14(11):e1006572. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006572
PMID: 30422974
49. Shen S, Ma WJ. Variable precision in visual perception. Psychological Review. 2019; 126(1):89. https://
doi.org/10.1037/rev0000128 PMID: 30335411
50. Norton EH, Acerbi L, Ma WJ, Landy MS. Human online adaptation to changes in prior probability. PLoS
Computational Biology. 2019; 15(7):e1006681. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006681 PMID:
31283765
51. Griffiths TL, Lieder F, Goodman ND. Rational use of cognitive resources: levels of analysis between the
computational and the algorithmic. Topics in Cognitive Science. 2015; 7(2):217–229. https://doi.org/10.
1111/tops.12142 PMID: 25898807
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